In Other Words, What is Justice?
Throughout the year, we have come to understand “justice” by looking at a collection of related themes and ideas– sometimes even used interchangeably with the word itself. In my attempt to define the asymptotic idea of justice, I will explain why each of these words cannot fully encapsulate the concept by themselves. By defining what justice is not, I hope to come close to finding out what it is.
Fairness
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls describes his theory of justice as fairness– “the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality” (720). Justice is what all people could agree on to be fair, had they no bias or interests other than in themselves (Jankovic, 9/10). Charles W. Mills disagrees with Rawls in his work, Theorizing Racial Justice. He argues that the ‘justice as fairness’ mindset is built solely for the ideal, equitable society, something that simply doesn’t exist in reality (Mills 27). In America, he says, “the real-life white family has functioned unequivocally in the basic structure to perpetuate white political rule.” Even if the world is “fair,” what does fairness truly mean when the structure of modernity is set up to privilege certain identities over others? Though justice is fair, fairness cannot universally connote justice.
Obligation
Immanuel Kant bases his principles of morality on the basis of intrinsic motivation and reason, holding that “the worth of character begins to show– a moral worth and beyond all comparison the highest– namely that he does good, not from inclination, but from duty” (529). I make the assumption, in this explanation, that justice is a moral act– which I believe it is. Kant says that a person is compelled by duty, not merely inclination, to do the right thing. Justice is not equivalent to obligation, but obligation should fuel individuals in the search of justice– we should think of justice as an imperative to uphold for the good of all. In Antigone, Antigone seeks justice for her brother Polynices, who has died without proper burial rights. She exercises this duty not out of obligation to her brother, but to the law of the Gods, which compel her to uphold rules of burial (Boyer 9/17). King Creon, on the other hand, denies Polynices a proper burial out of obligation to the laws of the state. Antigone seeks justice for her brother on the basis of obligation to the rules of the Gods, while Creon treats Polynices unjustly under obligation to state law. Obligation fuels both acts, but the act derived from obligation is not always just.
Law
The law is often seen as synonymous with justice. It is the tool through which states and the citizens within them may seek justice for wrongdoings. It frames the way injustices are viewed. In Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover argues that “no set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning” (4). The law and its institutions make up the world, and the world makes up the law. However, as much as the law is intended to be a force for justice, it often acts in ways which undermine that. The law is attached to a state, with its own state interests, which may supercede the interests of the individual citizens. For example, in her analysis of the Eichmann Trial in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt describes the proceedings as a show trial, intended on showcasing “”lessons” [Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion] thought should be taught to Jews and Gentiles, to Israelis and Arabs, in short, to the whole world” (9). The trial was criticized for attempting to serve justice to the entire Nazi regime in the implication of Eichmann alone (Boyer 10/22). When a higher power attempts to seek justice, often, state interests interfere with the pursuit of justice through the law. For this reason, the concept law cannot fully hold the concept of justice.
Vengeance
In his essay, On Jewish Revenge, Shachar Pinsker identifies vengeance as “connected to the realm of emotions and affect, for there can be a desire or a fantasy of vengeance without actualisation.” In plenary on October 17th, we discussed the relationship between justice and vengeance. Oftentimes, vengeance is triggered in response to injustice– therefore, would it be fair to view revenge as a method of achieving justice, or as justice in itself? In Death and the Maiden, Paulina is given an opportunity to enact revenge on her torturer. She decides, rather than having him be beaten and raped, made to feel all of the things he did to her, she merely wants him to confess on tape. “I know it’s ridiculous,” she says, “it’s ridiculous because no revenge can satisfy me” (59:50). In searching for justice after her horrific treatment, “eye-for-an-eye” revenge cannot satisfy Paulina. Revenge may be a mode through which some search for justice, but all justice is certainly not revenge.
Apology
The act of apology can be an individual one or one taken on by the state. In his article, “When nations apologize,” Edwin Battistella argues that “in its most sincere form, making an apology involves a naming of the offence, a condemnation of previous behaviour, and a request for forgiveness.” A true apology comes when both sides agree on what is being apologized for, and the guilty party agrees to alter its ways or change in some way. As it relates to justice, apologies can be a major step towards the reconciliation of past injustices– they can provide promises for future action and generate norms to discourage future injustice. However, there are also valid criticisms of the utility of the apology in the search for justice– the apology is certainly not a cure-all. In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, perpetrators of horrific acts of racial violence during apartheid were given the chance to tell the truth, or even apologize, to the families of victims. In some cases, this led to a collective healing from the injustices of the past. However, some critics held that the TRC did too little to achieve justice– putting on trial the individual crimes of apartheid, not the system as a whole (Lipsker 10/29). The mere act of apology cannot, by itself, achieve justice.
Forgiveness
In her chapter “When Should Law Forgive,” Martha Minow quotes Rachael Denhollander, a survivor of Dr. Larry Nasser’s sexual abuse of gymnasts: “Justice is not in opposition to forgiveness. Rather, justice is the foundation for forgiveness” (27). Forgiveness, like apology, is sought and dealt both by individuals and by the state. Forgiveness requires blame– according to philosopher Jacque Derrida, who we discussed in Plenary on April 29th, “forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable” (qtd. by Pyle). When ask ourselves how to seek justice for truly evil crimes– genocide, rape, torture, child abuse, etc.– we speak of acts that, at their core, are truly unforgivable. Yet, as a function of justice, it is imperative that we still come to terms with the reality of past injustices, and do our best to move forward (or backward) in a better way– forgiveness is a mode through which this happens.
Justice is none of these words, yet is related to each of them. Justice is fair. Justice is an obligation. Justice does not reside in the frame law, yet the law seeks to resemble it. Justice has an ongoing relationship to action, which a single act, like revenge or apology, oftentimes cannot achieve. Finally, justice exists in the world of the unforgivable, yet, takes into account this “unforgivability” and demands action and change in the interest of what is right for all people, despite it.
Bibliography
Arendt, Hannah . Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 5th ed. 1963. Reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
A Long Night’s Journey into Day. Directed by Frances Reid and Deborah Hoffmann, California Newsreel, 2000.
Boyer, Patricio. “Justice and Obligation,” 17 September 2025, HUM 103, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College.
Boyer, Patricio. “Theaters of Justice,” 22 October 2025, HUM 103, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College.
Death and the Maiden. Directed by Roman Polanski, Alliance Communications, Momentum Pictures, Fine Line Features, 1994.
Cover, Robert. “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative.” Harvard Law Review, vol. 97, no. 4, 1982.
Battistella, Edwin. “When Nations Apologise.” Aeon Magazine, 2017, aeon.co/essays/a-national-apology-has-the-power-to-change-the-future.
Immanuel, Kant. “Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.” Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Jankovic, Marija. “Justice and Equality, Distributive Justice, Rawls’ Difference Principle,” 10 September 2024, HUM 103, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College.
Lipsker, Yaakov. “Monuments and Memory,” 20 March 2025, Hance Audítorium, Davidson College.
Lipsker, Yaakov. “Power, Trauma, and Vengeance in the Shadow of Genocide,” 17 October 2024, HUM 104, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College.
Lipsker, Yaakov. “Apartheid and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa,” 29 October 2024, Hum 104, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College
Mills, Charles W. “Theorizing Racial Justice.” 12 February 2020, University of Michigan – Tanner Lecture on Human Values.
Minow, Martha. “Introduction.” When Should Law Forgive?, W. W. Norton & Company, 2019.
Pyle, Marcus. “Forgiveness and Restorative Justice,” 29 April 2025, HUM 104, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971.
Sophocles. Antigone. Translated by Robert Fagles, Penguin Books, 1984.
