Revised Moodle Posts
In the spirit of revision, these revised posts include indications, in bold, of where my original answers were changed. In some, the changes are drastic, some are tweaked, and some have been supplemented with entirely new ideas. In reflecting and revising on these works, I was able to look back on how my understanding has developed on a wide variety of topics this year.
Semester 1
Unit 1 – 29 August 2024 – 3 Questions about Jeremy Bentham’s, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapters 1 and 4:
- What is the principle of utility? What kinds of actions does it recommend? (ch 1)
- The principle of utility uses the measure of something’s worth by how useful (i.e. how much pleasure it brings to an individual/community) something is. It recommends us to take into account the needs of individuals and the community at large to make decisions on our actions (including/esp. laws and gov’t).
- The principle of utility doesn’t only ask people to measure pleasure in their calculation toward moral decisions, but pain as well. “Utility” is the tendency for a thing to produce a great amount of pleasure, happiness, etc., in relation to pain, unhappiness, etc. to the “party whose interest is considered” (15). This balance of pleasure over pain is integral to the understanding of Utilitarianism– it does not ask us to seek out an action that causes the least pain, but rather the most pleasure in proportion to that pain. The action recommended by the principle of utility is the one most likely to cause the greatest amount of pleasure, for the most people, while conferring the least amount of pain possible. In every moral decision, according to Bentham, we should be thinking about and applying this rule.
- What kind of proof can be given for the principle of utility, according to Bentham? What kinds of considerations does he offer to convince those who might doubt it? (ch 1)
- The list of reasoning leading a person to consider that there is no better alternative to utility– he proves that all things are centered in right and wrong, and it’s essentially impossible to come up with a different method without compromising to utility at least a little
- Bentham states that the principle of utility is so intrinsic that it does not need to be proven– he writes, “that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved…To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless” (16). He then goes on to list a series of proofs. He says that the principle is a default framework for human beings to make moral decisions, as we are all bound “by the two sovereign masters” of pleasure and pain (14). He says that even people who object to the principle, do so on the grounds of the principle itself. He shows this through a hypothetical scenario, where he imagines how one might come up with a principle besides his own– if it isn’t the same principle in different words, then is it not despotical, or anarchical? If not, does it not have a basis in right and wrong? If it does, then isn’t it merely another principle based on the baseline of Utility? Any principle which is based on an understanding on what is ‘right’, Bentham argues, cannot be separated from his principle of Utility. Thus, the Principle of Utility must be the only principle which may guide moral decisions.
- How is the value of a pleasure determined, according to Bentham? Can there be pleasures that cannot be compared? (ch 4)
- The value of pleasure is centered in its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity and its purity. Also, its effect on others has sway.
- The value of a pleasure is determined by its intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and its propinquity or remoteness. If the pleasure is produced in an act, the value is also determined by its fecundity (chances of the pleasure or pain begetting more pleasure or pain later), and its purity (chances of the pleasure or pain begetting the opposite of either later).
- Bentham recommends going through each of the instances of pleasure and pain after an action to add up the original pleasure/pain and any ramifications of the action which cause extended pleasure or pain to see its fecundity and purity.
- Yes, some pleasures cannot be compared because they are pleasurable in different ways– or unmeasurable?
- Confused on how pleasure/pain can really, concretely be measured– sometimes that just isn’t applicable.
- This is Bentham’s point– there is no way to empirically measure pleasure or pain. I would say now that the process of engaging with Bentham’s theory shows that all pleasures must be comparable– this is how they are measured. He instructs readers to “sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other” (32). To sum up all of the pleasures caused by or integral to something, one must naturally be able to compare these pleasures, if even merely by the fact that they are pleasures.
Bibliography
Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 1781. Batoche Books, 2000.
Unit 2 – 17 September 2024 – What is Obligation?
How do you define obligation? What gives obligation force? What constitutes an authentic obligation? How do we reconcile conflicting obligations?
Obligation is the notion that someone has a moral duty towards something else. If you have an obligation to something, you have a duty to that thing. In his essay, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Peter Singer defines obligation as “the abstract noun derived from ‘ought’” (Singer 233). If an individual has an obligation, that means that they “ought” to do it, as compelled by their personal moral principles.
In the plot of Antigone, obligation fuels Antigone’s sense of duty to the proper burial of her brother, Polynices. Antigone’s obligation stems from her duty to the gods. Polynices must be properly buried, not because he is Antigone’s brother, but because that is how the law of the gods demand burial be done (Boyer 9.19). She believes this to be a morally correct course of action, and pleads with her sister Ismene to join her– “he is my brother and—deny it as you will— /your brother too./No one will ever convict me for a traitor” (55-57). In this line, it is worth questioning– who would Antigone be a traitor to? At first, I believed that she saw respect for her brother in death as a familial obligation, but in truth, Antigone is only truly obligated to follow godly law, which demands her to carry out the proper burial of her brother. In this example, we see how obligation is fueled by moral duty– Antigone’s duty to serve the law of the gods.
Creon, on the other hand, has an obligation to the law of the city, which he creates. His obligations can be seen as an antithesis to Antigone’s, but both obligations are fueled by an overarching duty. In Creon’s case, his duty to uphold the law of the city– his “proclamation has forbidden the city to dignify him/with burial, mourn him at all” (227-28). He sees Polynices as a traitor, and thus cannot, on principle, honor him. These principles he holds are fueled by his obligation to the protection of the state, and the laws that make it up, over all else.
Ultimately, the question presented in Antigone is not whether obligation exists, but what it is fueled by. An authentic obligation is certainly one fueled by some duty, but what that duty is toward– the state, the gods– can change. All people hold obligations, but these obligations might ultimately be powered by different factors, leading people to act in diametrically opposed ways, like in the case of Creon and Antigone, to uphold different obligations they are similarly devoted to. Reconciliation of these conflicts, in my mind, involves people coming to an understanding of how these differences fuel the actions of others, which will lead to more compromise between those with conflicting obligations, as opposed to simply throwing people in jail.
Bibliography
Boyer, Patricio. “Antigone.” 19 September 2024, HUM 103, Davidson College.
Singer, Peter. Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Oxford Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 229–43.
Sophocles. Antigone. Translated by Robert Fagles, Penguin Books, 1984.
Unit 3 – October 1 2024 – Dance and the Body
The documentary, Dancing: Dance at the Court, reiterates ideas about the importance of the physical form of dance to make meaning and demonstrate cultural attitudes across time and place. It also counters the common stereotype which defines dance merely as entertainment, showing that dance as a political act, a true symbol of power. Ultimately, this shows the viability of dance not only as a form of entertainment, but as worthy of intellectual study.
Across cultures and times, people use their bodies to symbolize a deeper meaning through dance. Symbolism is discussed in the documentary in each of the four examples. In Louis XIV’s France, the physical placement of the dancers in line symbolized a person’s social standing (5:42). In Japan, a Bugaku dance performed correctly symbolizes continuity in the universe, the repetition of physical movements, along with actions, symbolizing the continuity of time, forever (19:50). For Ashanti kings, the simplicity or extravagance of dance at festivals symbolizes the status of the many chiefs, and the act of dance is viewed as an affirmation of Ashanti identity for everyday people (23:00). To the Javanese, court dancers are taught not to stand out, but to represent cultural values of selflessness and piety by moving in tandem with other dancers (43:30). In each of these examples, the movement of the human body in a specific way becomes a symbol of something much deeper.
Historically, the body has not been seen as an intellectual space (Bory 10.1). Dance is sometimes dismissed as frivolous entertainment, but the documentary brought up an idea not often discussed– that dance can be seen as a political symbol, representing power. Louis XIV used dance as a “weapon of state,” forcing the nobility at Versailles to perfect their dancing skills in order to succeed at court (4:50). Dances performed were physical metaphors for the King’s power, often featuring the character of Apollo, who Louis XIV envisioned himself as (9:45). In Japan, the Bugaku dance affirms the coronation of an Emperor, who connects common people to the Gods in the Shinto religion (16:50). To even be considered for the role of King in Ashanti tradition, one first had to master dance (22:10). To Javanese people, court dance represents holy power, creating equilibrium and balance in community with God (47:33). In France and the Ashanti culture, dance is a prerequisite for power, whereas in Java and Japan, it upholds Godly power and equilibrium within the universe. As much as we might think of dance as a mere pleasure, it is more than that– the political act of dance upholds structures of power which shape our world. Dance, while fun to watch and enjoy, is also worth studying as a political act.
Bibliography
Bory, Alison. “Dance as Demonstration of Power.” 1 October 2024, HUM 103, Davidson College.
Dunlop, Geoff, et al. “Dancing: Dance at Court.” ArtHaus Musik, 1993.
Unit 4 – 14 November 2024 – Cultural Creations: Confronting Stereotypes
Marlon Riggs’s documentary, Ethnic Notions, details a number of difficult and disparaging racial tropes, illustrating how cultural representations are created and maintained. For your Moodle post, please select one of the tropes described to discuss the following in a paragraph or two: (1) outline the historical framing offered, paying careful attention to the function of the trope to assert power and oppress African-Americans; (2) consider how that trope continues to be circulated in contemporary popular culture and/or how alternative images/representations have attempted to counter the trope.
One example of a racial trope deployed in American society to assert power over African Americans was the image of the “brute”. This trope defined Black people, specifically Black men, as violent, uncivilized, and dangerous. The Birth of A Nation, a 1915 silent film mentioned in Ethnic Notions, gives historical context for use of this trope. After emancipation, George Frederickson states, “the argument…was that Blacks, no longer under the benign or beneficent or kindly guidance of whites, were reverting to savagery” (17:25). The Birth of a Nation reflects this in its depiction of white women being pursued by white actors in blackface. According to academics, this characterization of the brutish, violent Black man incited racial violence and justified it. The media reinforced stereotypes of “the Black menace,” within white society, allowing them to view Black people as savages in need of control (17:40). This control could take many forms– from restrictive Black Codes to lynching.
In contemporary pop culture, the stereotype of the Black “brute” continues to associate Black Americans with danger and violence. One example given by Frederickson in the film is the trope of the Black cop, sidekick, or detective, who is “given a license to be even more violent [than]… the white heroes” (53:00). Filmmakers “capitalize” off of racial stereotypes in how they present Black characters on screen (53:30). This reaffirms assumptions within American society that can be harmful or even deadly– racial stereotypes and assumptions have resulted in countless tragic examples of murders of Black men by whites who carried an association between Black men and violence. In Loving Music Till it Hurts, William Cheng discusses the tragic killing of an unarmed seventeen-year-old, Jordan Russell Davis. The killing happened as a result of “racist ideologies,” internalized by his murderer, Michael Dunn, “that dehumanize, discredit, or outright destroy black life” (178). William Cheng discusses how “Dunn imagined black people as a legion– a resilient, formidable, vengeful, violent, monolithic unit perpetually on the hunt” (210). Ideologies such as this one closely relate to the way Black people have been portrayed in the media, and it is these ideologies that justify violence toward, or “outright killing,” of Black “brutes” who whites perceive as threatening.
Bibliography
Cheng, William . “Jordan Russell Davis.” Loving Music till It Hurts, by William Cheng, Oxford Academic, 2019.
Riggs, Marlon. “Ethnic Notions.” California Newsreel, 1987.
Semester 2
Unit 1 – 26 January 2024 – The Wages of Justice
Select one passage from Medea you feel represents the central conflict of her moral choices. Make sure you reproduce it here and write 250 words reflecting on it. Why is it representative of her arc? What is it about the passage formally (diction, tropes, etc.) that makes it so incisive?
See, my strength
and resolve vanish in the children’s
lively faces. It can’t be done.
Farewell to my schemes. When I leave, I’ll take
my sons with me. Why should I make them
suffer to revenge their father and make
my own suffering so much worse? No, farewell.
And yet what will change? My foes
unpunished mock me.
Should I endure it? The pledges I’ve made
my heart have weakened me.
The children begin to move toward the house.
Boys, go into the house.
Now, only the sacred and pure are allowed
to witness this sacrifice. My hand has strengthened.
Yet, my angry heart resists these urges.
Release the children. Spare them from my
wretchedness.
In Athens they will bring me happiness.
But it’s too late. By all of Hell’s vengeful
demons I’ll not leave my sons
for my enemies to ridicule.
The children
must die. I gave them life and now
I’ll take it. No more wavering. It’s settled.
(1019-1039)
In lines 1019-1039 of Medea, Medea contemplates her decision to kill her sons as an act of vengeance against Jason. She wavers– justifying the murder and denouncing her “wretchedness” in the span of thirty lines (1032). Madea’s monologue serves as a microcosm of how she spends the entire play justifying her moral choices to paint herself in the most flattering light possible. In this passage, she justifies killing her sons so that they are not left for her “enemies to ridicule” (1036). As she addresses the chorus starting at line 221, Madea justifies her need to avenge her husband’s betrayal. She doesn’t mention the murders she plans to commit this early in the play– her intentions become clear later in the story. Similarly, in this passage, she begins by searching for reasons her sons should live– they “will bring [her] happiness” in Athens– but ultimately settles on the fact that they must die (1033).
I found it striking how often Madea refers to herself in this passage– forming a motif of her self interest. At the beginning of the passage, as she views her son’s faces and thinks about the act it would take to kill them, she almost changes her mind about her plans. She questions why she should “make them suffer to avenge their father and make my suffering so much worse?” (1025). This dialogue reveals the extent of Medea’s selfishness– she laments the suffering of her sons, while in the same breath turning to the issue of her own suffering. She decides that she must kill the boys, lest they be ridiculed by her own enemies (1036). But, with this selfishness, comes Medea’s power. Medea becomes a martyr– she commits an act of unforgivable violence and pain both to herself and her own sons– out of her commitment to avenge the pain Jason inflicted on her. In her willingness to commit these atrocities, she sacrifices the lives of her sons, as well as her wellbeing, to the laws of the Gods. Medea bends the language of the law, killing her sons as a moral act, putting them out of the misery of a life of shame (Boyer, Plenary 1/30). However, she ultimately comes back to how the killing serves her own interests.
Boyer, Patricio. “Justice and/or Revenge.” HUM 104, 30 January 2024, Hance Auditorium, Davidson College.
Euripides. Medea. Translated by Michael Collier and Georgia Machemer, Oxford University Press, 2006.
Unit 2 – 20 March 2025 – Monuments to the Unthinkable
On March 20th, we read Clint Smith’s piece in the Atlantic, “Monuments to the Unthinkable,” and discussed the purpose of monuments in terms of constructing national memory and identity. Returning to my annotations of the reading, I found many more connections and thought-provoking ideas, especially in the pages where Smith discusses methods of memorializing the Holocaust in Germany, compared to enslavement in the United States. What should the purpose of memorials be? Clint Smith talks about how monuments invoke imagination– “I thought of my own children. What would I have told them about where we were going? How would I have assuaged their fear? How would I have assuaged my own?” (26). These questions stuck out to me in my first reading of the essay because they made me consider the point of monuments– I think at least some of the purpose (of a monument done well) can be found in the questions they spark, and the empathy they grow in people by forcing them to witness, something I found further evidence for in my second reading of the excerpt (see notes 5, 6, and 9).
The importance of the way monuments are constructed also stood out to me in this passage. Stolpersteine are a more decentralized, casual form of memorial– some people take valid criticism with this fact– but it cannot be denied that the nature of the monuments allows the audience to remember in a different way than a bigger monument would (see note 3). Clint Smith also thinks about the way his own hometown, New Orleans, memorialized slavery by “removing it’s homages to enslavers”– this type of reconciliation through the erasure of the evils, surely, is not the most effective way to remember and honor the pain of the past and completely impedes the process of acknowledging the continued legacy of such evils in the present day (28). As I wrote in my notes covering Dr. Lipsker’s plenary based on the reading, we “don’t want memorialization to be a way of forgetting.” Clint Smith’s reflection makes this point clear, especially at second glance, and demands we take a critical look not just at the steps taken towards memorialization, but the utility of those steps in helping construct collective memory.
Smith, Clint. “Monuments to the Unthinkable.” The Atlantic, Nov. 2022, pp. 25–41.
Lipsker, Yaakov. “Monuments and Memory,” 20 March 2025, Hance Audítorium, Davidson College.
Unit 3 – 8 April 2025 – What Constitutes Torture?
Watching Garage Olimpo helped me reflect on one assumption I have made about the definition of torture as the affliction of physical, versus psychological pain. My first thought when I hear the word “torture” is the kind of torture that involves the bodily harm of someone else– I think of waterboarding, or breaking wheels. However, the movie taught me most that the onus on torture should focus less on the type of pain involved and more on the vulnerability of the subject. In Garage Olimpo, a member of the Army blindfolds Maria and tells her that from now on, “she won’t see,” that her “world would be of sounds.” This practice of hooding and blindfolding might not be what people often first think of as torture, but in the deprivation of sight there is a complete loss of control of a sense, leaving them vulnerable– without even inflicting a wound, torture is possible and just as painful.
The state often justifies the use of torture, specifically psychological forms, under the need for intelligence. This is how the military officials sought to uphold the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib, invoking the “ticking time bomb” situation used often to justify torture, which “justifies torture of prisoners who have knowledge of an imminent attack” (Sontag). Stating that the mission was to “soften up” detainees (often non-combatant civilians with no information to share) to gather intelligence, the United States justified the humiliation and torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib (Henninger 244). After multiple prisoners died, some as a result of torture, in Garage Olimpo, Texas asks Felix what the point of keeping prisoners is– not to kill them, he says, but to interrogate them. As displayed in Garage Olimpo and by state powers, the definition of torture might be softened and stretched by state powers under the pretense of a need for intelligence– really, an emphasis on national security.
Garage Olimpo. Directed by Marco Bechis, Aqua Films, Istituto Luce, 1999.
Henninger, Katherine. “Atrocity or Nation-Building? The Difference Is in the Eye of the Beholder.” Mississippi Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1, 2008, pp. 237–66. EBSCOhost.Sontag, Susan. “Regarding the Torture of Others.” The New York Times, 23 May 2004.
